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NOT SO FUN CITY
William Casari
When the handsome and charismatic John Lindsay is elected mayor of New 
York in 1966, he inherits a city whose residents still see hope for positive change de-
spite the tumult of a notorious decade and gnawing fiscal problems. On his first day 
as mayor, the Transport Workers Union (TWU) goes on strike against New York 
City Transit and shuts down bus and subway service. In response the mayor walks 
from his hotel room to City Hall and remarks “it’s still a fun city.” The “fun city” 
line becomes the catch phrase of his term (The Fun City). Up in the Bronx, which 
Lindsay had visited during his campaign, things are changing. Many white-ethnic 
Irish and Jewish families are leaving the borough; their Puerto Rican and African-
American replacements tend to have a lower educational and socioeconomic level 
than their recently departed neighbors. The Bronx continues to grow as a broad 
multi-racial working class area and the Grand Concourse, a higher income area 
until about 1963, sees its first black resident move into a Concourse apartment in the 
mid-1960s. At the same time, specific blocks in the South Bronx are showing signs 
of strain, though the picture isn’t yet crystal clear. Race and ethnicity aren’t too far 
from anyone’s mind in New York City at the time, in the two years before Martin 
Luther King is assassinated.
The social fabric of certain neighborhoods is fraying with a rise in street crime 
and drug use coupled with population and economic shifts that result in vacated 
apartments and eventually, abandoned buildings. However, as late as 1971 most of 
the Bronx is physically intact. The worst is yet to come and will be a result of strate-
gies the city implements based on faulty data supplied by the fire department to 
unquestioning consultants; a massive out-migration of Bronxites; and other factors 
resulting from the early 1970s urban swirl. By 1977, during Mayor Abe Beame’s 
administration, the South Bronx is known worldwide as a desolate, burned-out 
wasteland, site of the worst non-war-related urban carnage any inner-city neighbor-
hood has ever known.
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Sound like a fictional TV drama or a fantasy version of the computer game 
Sim City? Sadly, it’s exactly what happened, as detailed in two books that go in 
depth “sounding the alarm” about why so many buildings and lives were destroyed 
in the Bronx as a result of fires. How did this happen to an area that had been a 
secure and stable neighborhood just a few years earlier? What really caused the 
fires in the South Bronx and what role did the city and its consultants play in the 
devastation?
In 2007, I was finishing my master’s thesis, Concourse Dreams: A Bronx 
Neighborhood and Its Future, and my friend J.J. Brennan—an amateur Bronx his-
torian—asked if I was including anything from a book called A Plague on Your 
Houses about the housing abandonment and subsequent fires that had consumed 
large swaths of the South Bronx. I had never heard of the book and immediately 
began reading about the connection between new fire alarm call boxes that actually 
resulted in less manpower responding to fires; a consulting firm called RAND that 
recommended closing/combining fires companies where they were needed most; 
and the connection between fires and contagious disease. My interest was piqued 
about the origin and spread of these destructive fires, of which only seven percent 
were attributed to arson. It was a missing chapter from my thesis.
I also read Joe Flood’s The Fires, which details the rise of citywide Fire 
Commissioner John O’Hagan, who presided over the worst of the 1970s fires, a peri-
od known as “the wars” in FDNY lore. When Lindsay was elected mayor, O’Hagan, 
“who strongly believed in the use of statistics and systems analysis to organize the 
department, became one of his leading allies” (The Fires). Lindsay also sought the 
advice of the RAND Corporation (a contraction of the words research and develop-
ment) and “on the surface it was a perfect alliance as RAND needed new clients, 
Lindsay needed a blueprint for rational government and O’Hagan needed support 
for his ideas for making firefighting a scientific discipline” (The Fires). It turned out 
to be a disastrous combination for poor and minority neighborhoods in New York, 
especially the South Bronx, already redlined by banks and left to fend for itself by 
the City of New York. Reading both books gives the reader a new understanding 
that many of the fires that consumed the Bronx south of Fordham Road could have 
been contained better, and—even more shockingly—that in some ways the city was 
a silent partner in the area’s destruction, wanting to clear land for more appropriate 
uses. In presenting these two books along with other related sources I intend to 
explain the role of Housing Commissioner Roger Starr, an advocate for planned 
shrinkage in declining neighborhoods, and show how media portrayals often cre-
ated, then perpetuated, stereotypes about the residents and the area. The authors of 
the following book, no strangers to numbers as trained epidemiological researchers, 
add up the data to create a social analysis of what happened.
A PLAGUE ON YOUR HOUSES
A Plague on Your Houses: How New York Was Burned Down and National 
Public Health Crumbled, by Deborah Wallace and Rodrick Wallace, “is a scorching 
indictment of the decision to close fire companies in New York in the 1970’s and 
a frightening study of the way misguided and malevolent social policy can spark 
a chain reaction of enormous and unforeseen urban collapse.” (Wallace). The au-
thors outline how the destruction of neighborhoods through abandonment and fires 
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eventually led to the spread of crime and disease not only in those neighborhoods 
but in the entire greater New York metropolitan area. The authors and reviewers also 
cite the social policy of “planned shrinkage” advocated by Housing Commissioner 
Roger Starr. While Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan advocated for “benign ne-
glect” of neighborhoods that were suffering, Starr went even farther pushing for 
policies that would accelerate the demise of built environments so the land could 
be cleared for other light-industrial uses like the Hunts Point Food Market (which 
today brings 60,000 truck trips a week through the area). In Plagues, the Wallace’s 
devote an entire chapter to “benign neglect” and “planned shrinkage,” linking those 
policies to the destruction of neighborhoods like the South Bronx where waves of 
conventional and arson fires followed.
In reviewing the book for the Journal of Public Health Policy, David Rosner 
writes that this thoughtful book integrates both a technical quantitative analysis 
with a profound social analysis of the “ways that the urban market for land, the 
capitalist use of space, and the social relations of class all conspire to undermine the 
health of the rich and poor alike.” (114). Taking a look at the South Bronx during 
the time period of 1974-1977 shows there was an “epidemic” of fires clustered in 
place and time. Thus there was a slow destruction of the community that resulted 
in out-migration (116). Loss of housing and homelessness were the most obvious 
manifestations, along with a swelling of welfare clients burned out of their homes 
and then re-housed in places like the Concourse Plaza Hotel near Yankee Stadium, 
which since 1923 had been a social gathering place for weddings, bar mitzvahs, 
Rotary meetings and an “apartment hotel” for Yankee ballplayers during the season. 
The eight-building Noonan Plaza Apartments in Highbridge, considered an Art 
Deco showplace by architectural historians and an address of distinction, was also 
used to house displaced people. As the City of New York began to move the newly 
homeless in, both of these properties began deteriorating causing longtime tenants 
and residents to move out as the quickly changing demographics reinforced racial 
and social fears during the Lindsay administration in the late 1960s. Disintegration 
of the social fabric in many neighborhoods was accompanied by the physical de-
struction of apartment buildings, a process that had begun in the mid-1950s as the 
Bronx began to change racially and post-war demographics shifted as children who 
had grown up in the area rejected the world of their parents and began to move 
to Westchester, Long Island and the newly opened Co-op City, a massive housing 
development near Pelham Bay Park in the Bronx.
The Wallace’s first published their findings in academic journals and were 
written off by RAND as “leftist ideologues with an axe to grind” (Flood 208). The 
Wallace team was accusing RAND and the Lindsay administration of a malicious 
attempt to burn down poor neighborhoods. While some felt the Wallace’s political 
claims were baseless, their technical criticisms of the models, which RAND largely 
ignored, were correct (209).
THE FIRES
Brown University Urban Studies Professor Samuel Zipp wrote a book review 
in The Nation about Joe Flood’s 2010 book. In The Fires: How a Computer Formula, 
Big Ideas, and the Best of Intentions Burned Down New York City, Flood explains how 
New York City Mayor John Lindsay hired consultants from the RAND Corporation 
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to help modernize municipal service delivery. Applying their formulas and number 
crunching to the fire department—and relying heavily on faulty, self-serving, inac-
curate information supplied by the Fire Department—the RAND “whiz kids” rec-
ommended an overhaul of fire station locations and the number of engines respond-
ing to fires, based on flawed firefighter response time data (Zipp 39). These decisions 
would have tragic consequences. The city instituted service cuts and reallocations 
that created dangerously unprotected spots in the South Bronx like Charlotte Street, 
East New York in Brooklyn and the Lower East Side in Manhattan—all poor, mi-
nority neighborhoods ravaged by housing abandonment. “Mayor Lindsay’s experi-
ment in systems analysis, Flood says, ‘burned down New York City.’” (39).
When interviewed about his book, Flood tells Marc Ambinder the following 
about “what happens when politicians paint by the numbers:”
According to the models, they [New York City] could close busy 
fire companies in fire-prone areas without much impact on overall ser-
vice. For the city, that meant saving money, focusing budget cuts in 
politically weak areas and supposedly not losing much fire protection. 
That was exactly what everyone wanted to hear, and they ran with it. It 
just happened to be wrong.
Flood details John O’Hagan’s rise to Chief of the Fire Department and how 
his philosophy fit in perfectly with Mayor Lindsay’s desire to try and bring control 
to the city using models and numbers.
Both Fires and Plagues prominently cite Roger Starr, Mayor Beame’s 
Commissioner of Housing Preservation and Development and former RAND em-
ployee, as a central character in this drama. In an article Starr authored for the New 
York Times titled “Making New York Smaller” he argues for reducing the footprint 
of city services in grim economic and fiscal times. Granted the fiscal crisis during 
this time was severe and the city needed new sources of revenue that didn’t involve 
new taxes or help from Washington, but what he writes near the beginning of the 
article is telling: “we could simply accept the fact that the city’s population is going 
to shrink, and we could cut back on city services accordingly, realizing considerable 
savings in the process” (Starr). Of course this begs the question of what neighbor-
hoods were targeted for a reduction in city services and how were they chosen. Were 
these the areas that were already seen to be in decline or had quickly-changing 
demographics? Many people were leaving the Bronx because of unsafe conditions 
brought on by housing abandonment and fires that were themselves a result of re-
duction in fire services and the social breakdown of neighborhoods. Yet, there was 
actually a need for new housing at the time apartments in the Bronx were burning 
down.
In another startling sentence Starr gives up on the American Dream alto-
gether: “essentially planned shrinkage is a recognition that the golden door to full 
participation in American life and the American economy is no longer to be found 
in New York” (Starr). The reader is left to wonder if Starr and his generation were 
the “last pioneers” to participate in the dream of urban America and now the hud-
dled masses will have to look elsewhere. Readers may also question why Starr invests 
no intellectual capital answering the very questions he poses; the final solution is 
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accelerated shrinkage of the South Bronx in order to clear the land. The solution is 
presented by Starr with no alternative discussion or questions.
The article authored by Starr is just one example of how media portrayals were 
used to stereotype neighborhoods and advocate for their demise from downtown 
city planners and consultants. The media are often mentioned as another culprit in 
the demise of the South Bronx because local newspapers and national magazines 
like Newsweek highlighted housing abandonment and incited racial fear, well before 
the major fires consumed neighborhoods. Was the media simply reporting what was 
happening, or was it fanning the flames, so to speak? Did the conversation move to 
a more serious level after people read major articles in the New York Times and other 
leading periodicals? Bronx history buffs and others would argue that the media was 
complicit. This also begs the question of which came first—the fires or the abandon-
ment? Or was it a combination of the two?
Steven V. Roberts, writing in the New York Times in the summer of 1966 after 
John Lindsay was elected, reports the following:
In the last decade Negroes and Puerto Ricans have gradu-
ally moved north and west from the ghettos of the South Bronx and 
Morrisania, looking for better housing in the narrow, well-kept avenues 
parallel to the Concourse. A recent study by a social service agency pre-
dicted that the area, 98% white in 1950, would be less than 50% white 
in 1975. The flight of the white middle class, almost imperceptible for 
years, has started to pick up. The slow exodus that opened good apart-
ments to minority families has been accelerated by their presence. In 
certain spots a familiar pattern has begun to recur. Buildings managers 
have grown careless about maintenance. City services—police protec-
tion, sanitation, and recreational facilities—have grown less reliable 
(28).
Another excellent example is “City Disease,” an editorial written by Stewart 
Alsop for Newsweek magazine in February 1972, six years after the Roberts story. 
The date is important, as much of the South Bronx was still standing; however, 
many apartment buildings were abandoned which caused the fall, like dominoes, 
of other buildings in the same neighborhoods. Roger Starr served as Alsop’s Bronx 
tour guide and one building in particular on Washington Avenue made Alsop’s 
point succinctly: “there is no mystery about what happened to 1176 Washington 
Avenue. The black people who lived there were terrorized by heroin addicts in need 
of a fix. When life became unlivable, they escaped, and there were none to replace 
them. The owner of the building abandoned it”(96). The thread of racism is barely 
hidden: a building so bad even black people can’t live there and implying that build-
ing abandonment came before the fires.
Alsop expands on junkies who moved in and stripped the building of any-
thing valuable, and then set fire to the structure. Later he compares the Bronx to 
an unlivable desert where city and federal “slumlords” own the buildings aban-
doned by private owners as the neighborhood deteriorates further into an urban 
cesspool. Alsop claims this process is killing our great cities. “The disease spreads 
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out inexorably from the black slums to the downtown areas, and even threatens the 
close-in suburbs. Can the disease be halted”(96)?
This echoes the Wallace’s point about contagious diseases spreading out from 
inner city areas to white suburbs. The dramatic tone of the article also plays on any 
Newsweek readers’ fears of “dark” inner city neighborhoods populated by drug ad-
dicts and black and brown people. These and many other media portrayals set the 
tone for the “new” public image of Bronx neighborhoods juxtaposed against the 
Grand Concourse itself, once a sought-after address considered the Park Avenue of 
the Bronx.
I was so surprised to read Alsop’s editorial written well before the wave of fires 
reduced many South Bronx streets to rubble and the destruction became known 
worldwide that I asked lifelong Bronxite and scholar Sam Goodman, who grew up 
in the Mt. Eden area of the Concourse, to read the Alsop piece and give me his reac-
tion. Goodman is currently an urban planner with the Bronx Borough President’s 
Office and lives on the lower Grand Concourse:
This article reminds me of the hundreds of similar writings. The 
material impresses me on two counts. First it appears to blame drug 
addicts for much of the problem, failing to note that these people were 
placed into the Bronx by the city itself and then abandoned, allowing 
them to shoot anyone with any resources in order to shoot up. Second, 
Roger Starr is the person who actually advocated for policies that to-
day we consider the prime cause for the very conditions outlined by 
the author. Hindsight is always 20-20, still it’s interesting to note that 
much of the Bronx was still intact in 1972. It would be at least another 
five years before things really worsened and another ten years for the 
borough’s population to drop by 303,000 residents. You might say that 
like so many previously printed articles, the intent of the writer was to 
encourage the destruction by often referring to the Grand Concourse as 
being threatened, without suggesting that anything was being tried to 
stem the process. Of course, we know nothing was. (Goodman).
Based on the writings of Roger Starr, Stewart Alsop and other journalists 
as well as evidence presented in A Plague on Your Houses and The Fires readers can 
infer—but not guarantee—that this thinking, planning and media reporting led to 
the municipally approved destruction of the South Bronx; the many pieces of the 
jigsaw puzzle came together to create urban chaos. While this information must be 
considered in the context of what was happening in the entire city and nation at the 
time, no other urban area was as devastated as the South Bronx. While many exter-
nal factors were also at work during this urban swirl, John Lindsay was the man in 
charge. With that in mind, the role of the RAND Corporation and the manner in 
which its data were interpreted and used by Fire Commissioner John O’Hagan with 
the mayor’s approval cannot be underestimated. John Lindsay had hoped crunching 
the numbers and computer modeling would help him get a stronghold over the City 
of New York but those hopes were lost on the streets of the South Bronx.
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